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46 Anekāntavāda and Syādvāda
the total view or the non-absolutist view of this thing. The view formed from a particular stand is a part of this total view, and though the different such views (i.e. the views formed from different particular stands) are (seemingly) contradictory of one another, they are really uncontradictory of one another inasmuch as they all find synthesis in the total view.
When a mind ignores and takes no account of diversities—qualitative (guna-dharmakrta) or essential (svarūpa- krta) as well as numerical (vyaktitva-krta)—while confining its attention to mere continuity (akhandatä) the universe appears to it as one and continuous. Understood from this standpoint of non-distinction (abheda), the word 'real' means something one and continuo othing more), and this type of partially true understanding of things is
nically called sangraha-naya (where 'naya'stand for a partially true understanding of things). The view taken of the universe from the standpoint of diversities--qualitative as well as numerical— is technically called vyavahära-naya, for here special importance is assigned to the diversities on which is grounded our everyday experience (loka-siddha vyavahara). On this view, the word 'real' denotes not something one and continuous but things different and discontinuous. When this tendency to take note of diversities confines its attention to mere temporal diversities, and concludes that the present alone is real because it alone is capable of performing a function (käryakara), that is to say, when the past and the future are excluded from the denotation of the word 'real', there results a partially true understanding of things which is technically called rjusūtra-naya. It is so called because it seeks to avoid the labyrinth (cakravyuha) of the past and the future while sliding along the straight line (rju-rekhā) representing the present.
The above stated three attitudes consider the nature of things without basing themselves on (the consideration of) words and their qualities and attributes. Hence the three resulting understandings are designed arth-naya. But there are also possible attitudes which consider the nature of things basing themselves on (the consideration of) words and their qualities and attributes. The understandings resulting from these attitudes are designated sabda-naya. Grammarians are the chief advocates of the various sabda-nayas, for it is on account of the divergent standpoints upheld by grammarians that one śabda-nyaya differs from others.
Those grammarians who regard all words as impartite (akhanda)