________________
20 Anekāntavāda and Syädvāda affirmation and negation of the predicate are respectively made in the first two propositions, the predominant feature in the first being position and in the second negation. The attribute verbally mentioned is evidently predominant, while the attribute not so mentioned, but only understood, is secondary and subordinate.
A thing is not absolutely devoid of its own nature and so it is described by means of affirmation as a predominant character. Nor is it omnigenous and so it is described by means of negation as a predominant factor. Negation is as much an attribute of a thing as affirmation. A pot has existence in respect of its own substance. This is affirmation. The pot has non-existence in respect of an alien substance. This is negation. Apparently thus the negation is a relative mode, that is, a mode with reference to another thing. But truly speaking this is not so. Negation is an intrinsic potency of a thing. A substance, if it were exclusively possessed of the attribute of existence bereft of non-existence, would not be able to preserve its substancehood. Negation is predicated with reference to other things and so it is called relative or 'dependent on others. The negation acts as a protecting shield by not allowing the encroachment of alien existences. A pot exists in respect of its own substance and does not exist in respect of an alien substance—both these propositions reveal the truth that the pot is a relative entity, as much dependent on itself as on others for its definite nature. This relativism falsifies either of the propositions, viz. the moment of existence of a thing is bereft of non-existence or that the moment of non-existence of a thing is bereft of existence. Existence and non-existence (affirmation and negation) are simultaneous. But this simultaneity is incapable of being expressed by a single word at a single moment. This is why a third proposition is requisitioned for expressing the simultaneity of existence and non-existence through the expression 'indescribable' (avaktavya). The implication is that the existence and non-existence are necessarily co-existent, but they are unspeakable simultaneously by a single expression on account of the absence of any linguistic symbol capable of discharging this ambivalent function.
It would follow from the above that there are only three fundamental predicables, viz. existent, non-existent and indescribable. The remaining four predicables are but the different combinations of these three taken two or three at a time. In the Agamic period the use of three predicables was mostly in vogue. The use of the seven