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350 Anekāntavāda and Syādvada
In view of the above discussion it would be clear that the Jainas were not blind in holding such a view regarding the nature of objects in the physical space on grounds of commonsense realism, but that they had vision of things and what they believed was based on a most scientific and cogent basis. For, who could deny that 'affirmations or judgments according to any naya or standpoint cannot therefore be absolute' considering the fact that 'even contrary affirmations of the very selfsame things may be held to be true from other points of views'. Speaking from a practical point of view, since both according to Jainas and Bradley most contrary characteristics of infinite variety may be associated with a thing, affirmation made with respect to it from whatever standpoint can never be absolute. “Thus in the positive relation riches cannot be affirmed of poverty but in the negative relation such an affirmation is possible as when we say 'the poor man has no riches'..... Thus in some relation or other anything may be affirmed of any other thing, and in other relations the very same thing cannot be affirmed of it'. (Op. cit. p. 176) This gives a clue to the real
ich the act of our judgment fails to qualify in the right and proper sense so as to give a meaning which may become categorical, positive or absolute without exception.
