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19
Jainas' Syādvāda and Bradley's
view of Judgment*
BRIJ KISHORE PRASAD
It seems somewhat paradoxical to find in Jainas' theory of judgment very much the same epistemological standpoint concerning the of objects as in that of Bradley, for, as regards their metaphysical and ontological views are concerned, both stand poles apart. The Jainas are realist and relativistic pluralist believing, on the one hand, not only in the reality of objects seen and perceived independent of any conscious effort, but at the same time believing in the real existence of many objects. Bradley, on the other hand, is an idealist of a very rigorous type who, contrary to what Hegel and other traditional idealists have been doing, would not tolerate even the identification of objects in the phenomeral world with inought, but would believe in merging all aspects of the universe into one infinite and homogeneous whole of experience or the sentience. However, the views of Jainas and Bradley concerning judgment or any proposition expressing truth and falsehood with respect to some phenomenal reality are very much identical.
Let us first refer to Jainas' view of Anekantavāda according to which there are not only innumerable types of realities both material and spiritual, but their character too is such that no categorical statement regarding their appropriate nature can he considered true and proper. Since every aspect of the universe possesses infinite number of both positive and negative character, it is utterly impossible to say anything regarding its nature which would be true unconditionally. I simple reason for holding such a view is that human knowledge is so
*
Indian Philosophy and Culture, 17/1, 1972.
