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318 Anekāntavāda and Syādvāda
true, then we have to find a way of determining the identity of a subject without bringing in the characteristics (dharmas) it possesses. But nothing which could determine this identity would be different from the characteristics a thing possesses, including the relation it has with a substance, time and nature. Thus in order to be able to reject contradition we need a theory denying all the possibilities of predication (as in the Advaita Vedanta or the Theory of Svalaksana); if predication is a possibility, as the Jainas themselves hold, no effort would be strong enough to save such a theory from contradiction. Syädvāda in that respect is selfcontradictory.
The distinction between naya and praināņa drawn by the Jainas is really the distinction between a categorical statement and the statement allowing the possibility of all other statements. A naya is the way people use language ordinarily and a pramana is the way they ought to use it prefacing every statement with ‘Syat' (may be). The statement “The pen is blue', it is to be necessarily presumed, would not serve this purpose, which the other statement 'Syāt, the pen is blue' is expected to serve. But, then, we are justified in asking as to why this recommendation should be followed : why a Syal statement is to be preferred over other statements without 'Syät' ? Apparently while drawing a distinction between naya and pramāna the Jainas have in mind the fact that a categorical statement excludes all contradictory and contrary statements. But in that case would a Syät-statement (S-statement, hereafter) exclude or not exclude a non-S-statement ? Obviously the answer has to be in the affirmative as long as the distinction between naya and pramāna is maintained. But what would be the negation of an S-statement ? Let us compare two pairs of these two types of statements with a view to see how negation functions in each case. Thus : (i) The pen is blue.
The pen is not blue. (ii) Syat, the pen is blue.
Syat, the pen is not blue. In (i) negation denies truth to the affirmattive statement. In other words, here negation negates the truth value of the affirmative statement and in that process also affirms the truth of the negative statement. In (ii) 'Syāt neither affirms nor denies truth value of a statement, for if the statement 'the pen is blue' or 'the pen is not blue' be true in its own right the function of 'Syāt' would become superfluous. In that case Syāt would be only a kind of mental attitude
| SR No. | 002012 |
| Book Title | Facets of Jain Philosophy Religion and Culture |
| Original Sutra Author | N/A |
| Author | Shreechand Rampuriya, Ashwini Kumar, T M Dak, Anil Dutt Mishra |
| Publisher | Jain Vishva Bharati |
| Publication Year | 1996 |
| Total Pages | 400 |
| Language | English |
| Classification | Book_English, Philosophy, Religion, & Nyay |
| File Size | 23 MB |