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15
The Conception of Syādvāda
R.C. PANDEYA
It is necessary to know the philosophical question to which Syādvāda provides an answer. Nowhere in the Jaina philosophy there is an explicit mention of this question except the statement to the effect that ordinary statments assert or deny absolutely whereas the fact is that reality is inultifaceted. In other words, the Sydváda is linked with the ontological theory called anekāntavāda and it stands or falls along with that ontology. If Syādvāda is a theory in logic, as many people have accepted, then we are justified in demanding autonomy for it; it should be able to stand on its own force, without invoking the support of a theory about reality. If this cannot be done then we are obliged to call Syadvāda an extension of the anekānta ontology. An ontological logic is an ontology applied to the way of thinking committed to that ontology; it would not be an analysis and criticism of thought in general. This kind of logic is obviously circular in the sense that here we take into account that thought which is basically the same as we would have liked it to be ; thus here we have a pertinent question : Is Syādvada a system of logic or it is an extension of an ontology to the realm of logic ? The second alternative seems to be the case, if the Jaina texts are of any value. But then what about those modern writers who see in Syädvāda a system of multi-valued logic ? It seems that either these writers in their enthusiasm forget the fact that for the Jainas Syādvāda is nothing but a version of the anekānta-ontology or in their thinking logic, as a system of theories, need not be autonomous.
Ontological neutrality of a logical system is a necessary prerequisite for its universal acceptability. It is a different matter that a particular system of logic owes its origin to a particular ontology; what is essential for it, however, is that it ought to be applicable to almost
