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An Analysis of 'syāt' in Syādvāda 303
propositions are the only bearers of truth-values yet they are bearers of not the same but perhaps of changing truth-values. It accepts change both of truth-value of a proposition and features of thing. On the plane of things it seem to argue that things or dravyas are the only entities that can take contrary gunas or paryāyas on different occasions and yet retain their identity at least which can form basis of re-identification and and recognition of them. That is why temporally indefinite sentences are taken to be paradigms of informative sentences. In saying this they indeed are in a great company of such masters as Aristotle. The reason for this seems to be that temporally indefinite sentences about a thing are the proper vehicles of communication. This contention obviously presupposes that knowledge properly so called must come ultimately in terms of direct acquaintance
This position, moverover, seems to propound that correspondence between proposition and facts is the basis of assigning truth values to propositions. Things change and take on new features. Such changed things cannot be matched with older propositions and yet get truth value truth. In order to be able to cope with the situation of things changing their features and our being able to describe them by means of propositions which not only bring out new features of a thing but also take truth-value truth we shall have to take either one of the following two courses : (a) frame altogether new propositions or (b) allow older propositions to change their truth-values. Without ruling out the first alternative completely the Jaina logicians seem to maintain that to be able to cope with such a situation propositions
hould also be taken to be changing their truth-values. Either changed proposition or propositions with changed truth-value correspond with changed things and this is how they take truth-value truth. Thus correspondence is the crux of the problem and changing thing is the reinforcing situation. Both these taken together seem to thrust on them acceptance of the change in truth-value of a proposition. This is what Jaina logicians seem to advocate. It is perhaps this which they intend to convey when they say that truth-value of no descriptive proposition is fixed in so far as things change.
The contention that truth value of a proposition changes, however, raises two important issues : (a) what is the basis of drawing a line of demarcation between sentences and propositions ? and (b) If it is maintained, and it is so maintained by Jaina logicians, that a thing has number of potentialities, then how to account for change in the truth-value of a proposition ? For whereas insistence on number of
| SR No. | 002012 |
| Book Title | Facets of Jain Philosophy Religion and Culture |
| Original Sutra Author | N/A |
| Author | Shreechand Rampuriya, Ashwini Kumar, T M Dak, Anil Dutt Mishra |
| Publisher | Jain Vishva Bharati |
| Publication Year | 1996 |
| Total Pages | 400 |
| Language | English |
| Classification | Book_English, Philosophy, Religion, & Nyay |
| File Size | 23 MB |