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258 Anekāntavāda and Syādvāda
the universals of lower grades, viz., man-universal, cow-universal, horse-universal and the like, they also eminently discharge the opposite functions of unification and differentiation. These universals are therefore called universal-cum-particulars. This constitutes evidence of the truth of the synthesis of opposites, which the Jaina propounds to be the universal truth.
As regards the Buddhists of Dignāga's school, who are the loudest in their protestations of the inviolability of the Law of Contradiction, they, too, are constrained to admit the validity of non-absolutism in exceptional cases. In the perceptual cognition of variegated colours in carpet, the unity of the content qua a carpet and the plurality qua colours are admitted to be present together. Besides, the plurality of contents of the cognition and the unity of the cognitive act are affirmed to belong to a seif-identical situation. The confession of the unity of the plurality is only an unconscious tribute to Jaina standpoint and if it is construed as corroboration of non-absolutism by the Jaina, we cannot accuse the latter of dogmatic zeal. The Sautrāntika and the Yogācāra believe in the plurality of powers of a single entity and this is an admission of the synthesis of plurality in one-which is the characteristic Jain position.
The Cārvāka materialist holds consciousness to be the product of four elements, earth, air, water and fire. The product is not numerically different from the elements, as that would make it a separate principle; nor is it identical severally with each, as in that case even jars and tables would possess spirit. It is thus one and the four at the same time. This is only a confirmation of anekāntavāda. The affinities of Mimāmsist logic and ontology with the Jaina thcory are too pronounced to be ignored. The Mimāmsist believes in the dual nature of reals, constituted by being and non-being as elements, and is thus at one with the Jaina. The later Vaisnava philosophers, who believe in unity and plurality both and in their ultimate synthesis, cannot but endorse the Jaina logical standpoint. As regards the Prabhākara school of Mimāmsā, it also has to fall back on non-absolutist logic on occasions. One instance will suffice. According to Prabhākara all cognitions are cognisant of three elements, the content, the act of cognition (that is to say, their own identity), and the self as the knower. Accordingly all cognitions are held to be judgments by him of the form 'I know this.' The synthesis of three in one constitutes an endorsement of the Jaina logical standpoint. The purpose of this long schedule of affinities with other