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Non-Absolutism (Anekäntavāda) 255
the contrary that difference of relations and conditions is the cause of real difference of ontological status. The criterion of difference is the opposition of character and the proof of such difference is the difference of conditions and this twofold criterion is fully applicable to the case of being and non-being. That being has a character which is the opposite of that of non-being and that the two are entailed by different conditions does not require proof, as the opponent also cannot deny them. The Jaina position that being and non-being are essential elements of the nature of a real should be taken as established. We have considered the various objections advanced by thinkers of opposite schools and it cannot be denied that the Jaina has met them with considerable force of logic. As regards the charge of contradiction involved in the compresence of being and non-being, which constitutes the main plank in the platform of the rival philosophers, the Jaina simply declines to accept the charge as authentic. We have considered the problem of contradiction in the
chapter and therein we have dealt with the four types of
itional relation. The Jaina has made out that none of these types is applicable to the case of being and non-being, as both are perceived elements in a real. The Jaina has further made out that experience is the ultimate determinant of contradiction and the compresence of being and non-being is endorsed by experience. The Jaina has further resolved the opposition of reason and empirical knowledge. We do not think it necessary to enter into arguments that we have produced in the first chapter. We had to deal with the concept of opposition repeatedly as occasion required and we are perfectly sure that the careful reader of the present book does not stand in need of being pumped with the arguments that the Jaina advances in support of his position and in answer to the animadversions of his opponents. Suffice it to say thah being and non-being are true elements of reality, which is determinante in all cases. The Jaina does not believe in indeterminate being and indeterminate non-being, which are according to him abstractions of formal logic. The opposition of indeterminate being with indeterminate non-being, on which the idealistic logician banks, has thus no force against the Jaina realist. The Jaina is an empiricist in the matter of determination of the nature of reality and it seems absolutely certain that in so far as the plain delivery of experience is taken into consideration the Jaina stands on
17. sa eva hi bhedo bhedahetur vā yad viruddhadharmadhyāsaḥ kāraṇabhedas
ca--Quoted in the KP, Ch. V.