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Non-Absolutism (Anekāntavāda) 219
example may illustrate the truth of our contention. A beverage is made of several ingredients, sugar, curd, spices, and so on. It is a matter of perception that beverage has a self-identity of its own different from that of the ingredients. The beverage is a unit--an organic whole. Likewise the synthesis of the two attributes, existence and non-existence, gives rise to a novel attribute, which transcends the two and at the same time comprises them as distinct elements in its being. It would be a mistake to suppose that this novel attribute, which cannot be grasped by a definite concept and, so, inexpressible by a definite linguistic symbol, is the exclusive characteristic of a real. That inexpressibility or indefiniteness is a factual characteristic, and that it emerges on the synthesis of the opposites is a truth which cannot be denied without stultiyfying experience. But this does not mean that the indefinite' or the inexpressible' (avaktavyá) annuls the distinctive individuality of the elemental attributes, existence and non-existence. We must appeal to experience to determine the nature of existents; and, as has been set forth in the first chapter, reliance on abstract logic in this matter is more often than not a source of error and positive misconception. The indefinite or inexpressible is felt together with the definites, existence and non-existence. The pen is indefinite, but is felt as definite qua existent and non-existent at the same time. The fifth proposition asserts the compresence of 'existence with the indefinite, the sixth affirms the compresence of non-existence, and the seventh completes the modes by affirming the consecutive presence of the two, with the indefinite.
The indefinite or the unspeakable is a characieristic concept of Jaina philosophy. The Vedāntist has proved that the nature of existents, as revealed to empirical knowledge, is a complex indefinite,
cannot be characterized either as real, or unreal, or both, or neither. By reality the Vedāntist understands logical being, which does not admit of lapse or negation in time, space and its uniformity. Phenomenal reals have reality in their own context and are non est outside this context. So, they cannot be regarded as having reality in their own right. In the ultimate analysis, phenomenal objects are unspeakable as real or as unreal, since reality, absolute and unconditioned, is lacking in them. The very fact that they are non-existent elsewhere and elsewhen is proof of their lack of reality in their own nature and right. But they are not unreal fictions, as they are objects of experience while fictions are not. Thus, they are unspeakable and indefinable as real or unreal. The Vedāntist