________________
154 Anekāntavāda and Syādvāda
(siddhasādhyatā) against the doctrine of existence in respect of one's own nature and non-existence in respect of an alien nature and the charges of triviality and insignificance also follow from it. But the above evaluation of the nature of relation, implicd by the doctrine, should be considered sufficient for the refutation of these charges. For the Vaiseșika philosopher, the relation of identity-cum-difference is quite novel, and the light that it throws on the nature of the real is quite momentous and significant. The real cannot be, as already shown, either absolute being-or absolute non-being. Here by 'absolute being we understand what is eternal, positive and absolutely unamenable to change, and by "absolute non-being' what is absolutely negative and devoid of all characterization. These are respectively the postulates of the Vedāntic monist and he Buddhist nihillist. Similarly, the real cannot be either pure being' or 'pure non-being'--the expression “pure being standing for being without becoming' or 'continuant without change' (change in the sense of real creative change and not mere actualization of the potential), and 'pure non-being' standing for 'becoming without being' or 'change without continuant'. These may respectively by regarded as the postulates of the saikhya evolutionist and the Buddhist fluxist. The Jaina philosopher believes in being tolerant of non-being, and non-being tolerant of being. For him, in other words, being and becoming are informed with each other and go pari passu, one without the other is impossible.
Unity and Plurality or One and Many From the above analysis of the real into being and becoming, it follows that it is also unity and plurality, or one and many. If the real as being is self-identical unity, i.e., one, the real as becoming is plurality, i.e., many. A positive entity (bhāva) eg., the self-is ipso facto plural, unlike negation (THT) which, being homogeneous, does not brook distinction or plurality within itself, and at least six distinct stages-viz. origination, continuity, transformation, growth, decay and lapse-can be distinguished in its process. Plurality, in fact, is plurality of aspects, and the multitude of concepts and the corresponding linguistic expressions, related to a single fact, is a proof
8. See AJP, pp. 90 Seq. 9. For the Jaina philosopher's arguments proving the absence of contradiction between
being and non-being, vide infra. 10. TV, iv. 42 (4) 11. TV. iv. 42 (5)