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136 Anekantavāda and Syādvāda
sambandha). Having noticed that he favours the view that every distinctive meaning needs a distinctive word (pratiniyatavācyavácakabhava) for its medium, we may now resume our treatment of the copresentative predicate of the inexpressible (avaktavya) and of its differentiation from the consecutivepresentative, in their respective modes, under the method of seven-fold predication.
If the above principle of one word for one meaning is granted, then the concept of the inexpressible in syädväda lends itself to an easy grasp. The fourth mode, viz., “The jar is inexpressible”, is an attempt to present the aspects of being' and 'non-being in the jar, at once (yugapat), and, as primary meanings.
Although both these aspects are the inalienable features of the jar, a simultaneous attention to both aspects is a psychological and logical impossibility. Moreover being conveys the meaing of one aspect and non-being of the other. A conveyance of both meanings at once is incompatible with the established rule. viz., vācyavācakaniyama. To say that one word. like avaktavia in the present context, can convey both the meanings at once would not be correct, according to the Jaina, because of two reasons : first that no word can convey more than one meaning at a time, and secondly, even if it can, our mind can attend to them only in a successive order. A further mention of these difficulties incident to the concept will presently be made.
No such difficulties arise in the case of the third predication
between these two extremes. Accordingly, he believes that although meaning is natural potency of a word it needs the aid of convention for its discovery as well as its expressive use. The power." it is said. "is natural, but is made effective only by convention. We have to learn the relation of words to facts and this shows that knowledge of convention is necessary for understanding the meanings of words. But the knowledge of convention is only a means to the discovery of the power of the word and does not make the postulation of power unnecessary or redundant." (JPN. p. 119). But whatever the relative proportions of the role played by power and convention, the stand taken by the Jaina with regard to the problem of word-meaning relation is consistently maintained (cf. ekapadasva pradhanatayā anekadharmavacchinnabodhakatvain nasiiti niyamasyoktatvät/SBT, p. 66. For a further discussion on how collective terms like army (senā), forest (vana) etc., and how terms expressing plural number, like trees (vrkśâh) etc., can be explained in terms of the Jaina conception of word-meaning relation, see SBT, pp. 63-67. The relavant granımatical points, bearing on the explanation of these terms, especially the terms involving the plural number, are also mentioned by the way, often in opposition to Panini's view on the matter (ibid.).