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112 Anekantavāda and Syädvāda
Laying such an exaggerated emphasis88 on the universal as to leave no room at all for the particular leads to sangrahābhūsa, a fallacy of which the Sankhya and the Advaita schools of philosophy are notable instances.89
Vyavahāranayao (the standpoint of the particular) In contrast with the sangraha standpoint the vyavahāra standpoint specialises itseif in being concerned with the specific features of the object concerned, without, of course, losing sight of the fact that they cannot stand by themselves without the support of the generic properties in the larger setting of concrete reality. For example, when a person is asked to bring a mango fruit he attempts to bring, but not any other fruit, although he is aware of the fact that mango is only a species in the genus of friut.92
When the generic correlative of a specific feature is entirely ignored the resultant fallacy comes to have only the semblance of the vyavahāra standpoint (Vyavahāranayābhāsa) of which there can be no better example than the materialism of Cārvāka93 in Indian philosophy.
The above three standpoints, viz., naigama, sangraha and vyavahāra, come under the first comprehensive category, viz., dravyārthikanaya. This is so because these standpoints concern themselves with the durable side (dravyasamsparsi) of concrete reality. The remaining four standpoints, viz., rjusūtra, sabda, samabhirudha and evambhüta, engage themselves in the analysis of the fleeting side (paryāyasamsparśī) of concrete reality. Hence their collective designation (paryāyārthikanaya), the second of ihe two comprehensive Categories.
88. sangraho' pyasesavisesāvis esapratiksepamukhena s āmanyamekam
samarthayamāno durnayah.../ Nyāyāvatāra (P.L. Vaidya's edn. ) p. 85. 89. sangrahābhiprayapravrttāh servepyadvaitvädāh sankhyadars' anain ca./ See also
PNTA, VII. 17 and 18 and the SRK thereon. The reason why the Sankhya system in instanced here is stated by Prabhācandra: vikāravikārinoh
sankhyaistādātmyābh yupagamāt/NKL, Vol. II, p. 629. 90. This vyavahāranaya should be distinguished from another naya, bearing the same
name and occurring in a different classification of nayas into niscayanaya (the true viewpoint) and vyavahāranaya (the conventional or empirical viewpoint). There is
nothing common between the two except the name. 91. visesātmakamevärtham vyavahärds ca manyate/
vi'sesabhinnam sa manyam asatkharavisānavat //NKV, kā. 8 92. Ibid., kārikäs 9 and 10. 93. PNTA, VII. 26. For two other instances see LTB, V, kā. 42 and the NKC thereon in
NKC, Vol. II, pp. 631-5.