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THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
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of view of its own quadruplet the thing in question exists, that is, its ‘isness' is established. At the same time, from the point of view of the quadruplets of all things other than this one, its ‘is-notness' is implied. Thus a thing 'is' (asti) and also ‘is-not' (nāsti) and since it cannot be said to be 'is' and ‘is-not' at one and the same time, it is also inexplicable (avaktavya). These three conditions produce seven permutations: asti, nāsti, asti-nāsti, avaktavya, asti-avaktavya, nāstiavaktavya, and asti-nasti-avaktavya. And, in order to avoid the pitfall of being misunderstood, the speaker uses the adverb syāt before everyone of these modes of predication. This term syāt in this context is the most significant; it means 'in a way', 'from a certain point of view', *also', or 'not absolutely'. So when we say, “syāt 'A' is a son, we mean that he is also a son and not only a son; that in relation to his father 'B'; 'A' is a son, but that in relation to his son 'C' he is a father; similarly, he may be a brother, a friend, a husband, an enemy and so on, in his relationships with different persons. If we do not use the prefix syāt with the statement that we make, it is likely to be a categorical affirmation, a dogmatic assertion, precluding the possibility of the existence of other relationships or other aspects of the person 'A' in question. The use of the term syāt limits the sense of the seven permutational, and for the matter of that, any other relevant vocal statement. In making an assertion, the institution of syadvāda thus curbs down, limits, qualifies, modifies and harmonises the absolutist views conveyed by individual nayas. In fact, in order to give shape and expression to our comparehension of an idea or object, we start analytically, resolving, separating, and differentiating its parts, aspects or facets. But, while considering one of the many aspects, the rest must not be denied. Synthesis follow analysis, putting
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