________________
18
JAINA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
character as general and the particular as particular, since this kind of distinction is comprehended in the latter stage of knowledge, viz., comprehension. Apprehension is the stuff which is transformed into comprehension. Vatsyayana is also in perfect agreement with him in holding the view that determinate cognition has the same object as indeterminate has. The difference between the two lies in the fact that determinate cognition is the knowledge comprehending the name of its object revived in memory by association, whereas indeterminate cognition does not cognise the name and the like, since it is not involved in verbal images. Jayanta Bhatta's criticism of the Buddhist view that if indeterminate cognition apprehends only the unique individuality of its object, how do its general features suddenly enter into the succeeding cognition, viz., determinate knowledge, is quite similar to the observation of Hemacandra who holds that it is a truism that nothing is produced which was absolutely non-existent and nothing existent suffers absolute destruction. The consciousness of generality must be already embedded in apprehension, which is only brought to relief by the latter stage of cognition. The consciousness of generality which is implicit in apprehension becomes explicit in the succeeding state of knowledge. The object of comprehension is essentially the same as that of apprehension. William James records the same fact when he states that there are two kinds of knowledge broadly and practically distinguishable; we may call them respectively knowledge of acquaintance and knowledge-about.
