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Hemacandra on Justifying Syādvāda and
Anekāntavāda
Raghunath Ghosh
Hemacandra in his Pramānamimāṁsā has forwarded some arguments in favour of justifying Syādvāda and anekāntavāda and refuted the view of the opponents. Our effort is to give a critical exposition of the position of Hemacandra on this score.
Let us concentrate on the arguments given by the opponents as put forth by Hemacandra in connection with the refutation of the tenability of syādvăda. It is the contention of the Jaina-logicians that the substance and mode are somehow identical and different both, but not absolutely different and absolutely identical. The opponents are of the view that such standpoint is not at all admissible due to having the defects like contradiction etc. of the following type.
First, just as an entity cannot be both blue and not blue in the same locus, both the affirmative and negative assertion in the same object cannot coexist, as they are opposite to each other'. Secondly, if an object is both identical and different, an object becomes identical in respect of one aspect and different in another. From this, it will follow that there will be another locus of difference and another locus of identity leading to the non-integrity of the locus (i. e. as locus will not remain as one). Thirdly, the object is identical in some aspect and also different in some aspect. These aspects are also to be taken again as endowed with identity in some aspect and different in some aspect. Otherwise, every thing would come under the influence of ekāntavāda (absolutism) but not anekāntavāda and there would arise the defect of Infinite Regress (anavasthā). That is, the locus of the identity and difference has to be
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