Jaina Theory of Multiple Facets of Reality and Truth

SR No.: 001746
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Nagin J Shah
Publisher: B L Institute of Indology
Publication Year: 2000
Total Pages: 168
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, & Nyay
File Size: 12 MB

Page 89

The Seven-plank Epistemological Frame-A Search for its Rationale
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famous sapta-bhangi naya or seven-plank logic. But there is one fundamental difference. Jaina propounders of the sapta-bhangi frame based the co-existence of sat and asat on the basis of their theory of anekānta, which admits existence and non-existence together at one locus at different times or conditions, unlike the Buddhists, thereby bypassing the objection regarding simultaneous co-existence of conflicting attributes in one object.
Now, I take up the four questions posed earlier. The conventional justification for the seven bhangas, put forward by Jaina writers, which the Saptabhangi-tarangini has also followed is this. It is said that there are seven types of dharmas inherent in all objects and corresponding to these seven dharmas, there are seven types of samsayas, corresponding to the samsayas, there are seven forms of jijñāsās; corresponding to the jijñāsās, seven types of praśnas and corresponding to the praśnas, there are seven types of answers. The Saptabhangītarangiņī also quotes this verse
bhangās-sattvādayaḥ sapta, saṁśayāḥ sapta tadgatāḥ/
jijñāsāḥ sapta, sapta syāḥ praśnāḥ saptottarānyapi// These seven inherent fundamental dharmas or aspects are stated as follows: sattva, asattva, kramārpita sattvāsattva, avaktavyatva, sattvavisista avaktavyatva, asattvavisista avaktavyatva, and kramārpita sattvāsattvavisista avaktavyatva.
After this, the author discusses at some length, some of the possibilities raised by me in my questions (2) and (3) above and shows the inadequacy of less than seven bhangas and the futility of more than seven bhangas. Of the former, he considers even a case, according to which all the six bhangas from the second will be superfluous, which naturally implies the total collapse of the saptabhangī. On the higher side too he considers cases of eight bhangas and nine bhangas and discounts them both in his own way.
Instead of repeating these prepositions contained in the texts, I propose to look at this saptabhangi scheme in a new unconventional manner, with a view to examine whether such an approach can be of any help in our search for a rational base for the saptabhangi logic. My approach is based on the types of our everyday experiences and