Jaina Theory of Multiple Facets of Reality and Truth

SR No.: 001746
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Nagin J Shah
Publisher: B L Institute of Indology
Publication Year: 2000
Total Pages: 168
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, & Nyay
File Size: 12 MB

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Jaina Theory of Multiple Facets of Reality and Truth
or even three-plank frames of epistemology? If yes, what is the
logical deficiency in those theories? 2. Even if there were some deficiencies in the four-plank frame,
was it not possible to rectify the deficiency by adding just one or two more planks? That is, why was it found necessary to add three more planks at one stroke? In other words, will not a pañcabhangi or șad-bhangī frame be adequate to correct the deficiency of the catuskoți argument? Were the possibilities of five-plank and six-plank frames fully considered and found logically wanting, before settling for a seven-plank frame? If so, what is wrong with pañca-bhangī or sad-bhangī frames? Leaving aside questions such as these concerning the lower side of seven, it will be quite pertinent to ask: Why did the Jaina philosophers, who thought on this problem, not go beyond seven planks? Is it because they were convinced that the seven-plank frame of epistemology is the most rational one? Had they satisfied themselves that there was no justification for an epistemological frame with more than seven planks? Were such possibilities of asta-bhangi-naya or nava-bhangi-naya considered at all by Jaina philosophers at any stage? Last, but not least important of all, when the basic norms for the epistemological frame are only three, narnely, sat, asat and avaktavya, does it not stand to reason that there should be only a three-plank epistemological frame with syād-asti, syād-năsti and syād-avaktavya? In other words, will not a trinary frame be the most rational, when the alternatives available are three, namely
asti, nāsti and avaktavya? If logically satisfactory answers could be found for these questions, a rational base for saptabhangi naya may be taken as established. The present paper is an attempt to search for such a base. For the purpose of this paper, I shall confine myself to Saptabhangītaranginī, which has sought to grapple with most of these problems.
Before we proceed to answer these questions in our search for rationale of the seven-plank logic of Jaina philosophers, it will be useful to have a brief conspectus of the background of this sapta-bhangi