Jaina Theory of Multiple Facets of Reality and Truth

SR No.: 001746
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Nagin J Shah
Publisher: B L Institute of Indology
Publication Year: 2000
Total Pages: 168
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, & Nyay
File Size: 12 MB

Page 74

56
Jaina Theory of Multiple Facets of Reality and Truth
identity of the both', from one and same point (amsa). 'Existence' is taken into consideration as having one condition, and non-existence' as possessing another condition; that is, an entity has 'existence' by sva-rūpa and 'non-existence' by para-rūpa etc. Take for instance the whole cloth composed of a single variegated colour, it is of blue from one stand-point, and it is of another colour from another stand-point; and in this the Nyāya-Vaišeșikas differ from the Jainas.
According to the Nyāya-Vaišeșika metaphysics, there cannot be several colours in one and the same object, colour being vyāpya-vịttidharma (attribute pervaded by its locus) or attribute which does not coexist with its absolute negation (sva-samānādhikaraṇātyantābhāvāpratiyogi dharmaḥ). Thus variegated colour present in the whole, say a cloth, is not a mere product or combination of particular colours present in each component part, and, as such, is a distinct variety of colour standing on the equal footing with other varieties of colour. This idea of the Nyāya-Vaišeşikas is derived from the fact that a composite product (avayavin) is entirely different from its component part (avayava). According to the Jainas, however, even in a single whole variegated cloth the blueness is conditioned by the colour of indigo etc., and other colours are conditioned by such and such dyeing substance, various colours being coexistent in one and the same entity. Similar is the case of mecaka jewel (composed of different colours), where a variety is seen to be conditioned by matter of such and such colours. Syādvāda holds that many individual colours and their substratum, say cloth, is distinct and non-distinct by some way or other (kathamcit, syāt); and similar is the case of 'existence' and 'nonexistence'. This is quite evident from the fact that a single person has attributes 'fatherness', 'sonness' and 'nephewness' etc., which do not contradict one another on different conditions. Here it should be borne in mind that this does not unduly lead to an arbitrary conclusion that a single person is somehow a father and a mother etc
The opponents might urge that it is a fallacy to assign predicates (or attributes), which are mutually contradicted epistemologically (or ontologically), to a single substantive (or entity). According to the Jainas, however, such predicates or attributes do not yield any contradiction, and above-mentioned fallacy is not actual but apparent