Jaina Theory of Multiple Facets of Reality and Truth

SR No.: 001746
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Nagin J Shah
Publisher: B L Institute of Indology
Publication Year: 2000
Total Pages: 168
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, & Nyay
File Size: 12 MB

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Jaina Theory of Multiple Facets of Reality and Truth
primarily taken into account, attributes like 'existence' etc. are invariably considered as distinct and many, and hence abheda-vịtti in question is impossible. Thence, in this regard, there cannot be distinct and many attributes belonging to one single entity at the same time. If that were possible, the locus viz. entity might be manifold according to the diversity of such attributes. Similarly the impossibility of abhedavịtti, on the assumption of the primacy of phenomenal view-point, applies to other seven cases also.
Thus infinite attributes 'existence' and 'non-existence' etc. cannot abide in a single entity with distinction, according to time etc. However, when such diverse attributes as 'existence' etc. cannot exist with nondistinction in a single entity, or in other words, their unity is taken to be unreal, non-distinction is only superimposed on diversity of attributes (abhedopacāra). This is the reason why the term abhedopacāra is introduced in the definition of complete statement'. (RA IV, 44; SBT p.36)
However, though both the statements have been discussed to be in different categories, standing on utterly different bases, in origination and structure, yet the complete statement postulates, in process of its origination, two kinds of means viz. abheda-vytti and abnedopacāra, the logical grounds of which are again sought in point of view (naya). So it might be urged that there is no distinct qualitative difference between the two statements. On this, no text seems to have discussed in full length. But it should be understood that it is in respect of each formula or proposition of categorical nature devoid of the idea 'syāt that abheda-vrtti or abhedopacāra is taken into account, in course of origination, by resorting to noumenal and phenomenal view-points respectively. And 'complete statement' becomes complete only when each proposition of categorical nature, established on the strength of such non-distinction, has come to possess the idea of 'syāt'. To this effect Vimaladāsa explains thus: the complete statement, in its
8. Mallişeņa further proceeds to prove, quoting almost verbatim from RA IV. 44,
the impossibility of abheda-vrtti or non-distinction of attributes, on the strength of eight kinds of determinants viz. time etc., which arises when the primary emphasis is laid on phenomenal view-point. But here it is omitted.