Jaina Theory of Multiple Facets of Reality and Truth

SR No.: 001746
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Nagin J Shah
Publisher: B L Institute of Indology
Publication Year: 2000
Total Pages: 168
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, & Nyay
File Size: 12 MB

Page 67

A Study of Syādvāda
49
only in succession. And there is neither dvandva compound, nor karmadhāraya compound, nor a sentence which can give expression to the idea of simultaneous unification of existence'and non-existence'. Thus the fourth formula of syādvāda is brought about.
And further one cannot maintain an absolute judgment, with regard to the third formula, that anyword is solely expressive of both affirmative and negative aspects in succession; since it is very often experienced that words denote either of these two aspects. Or neither can one hold an absolute contention regarding the fourth formula, that any word always refers to the inexpressibility of both the aspects at one time; since even the term 'inexpressible' in this context cannot be brought into use. Thus each of the seven formulae constitutes the whole syādvāda, but each and every formula suffices to be syādvāda so long as it is equipped with 'syāť. However, if each formula is, as has been shown in the above examples, understood unconditionally (aikāntyena) without 'syāt', there occur invariably various kinds of fallacy. (RA IV, 17-28; SBT p.60ff.)"
III
When it is understood that a single entity is possessed of infinite attributes of affirmative and negative natures, there might exist, in principle, infinite number of formulae in accordance as attribute varies. Then what is the use of limiting its number to 'seven?
In reply to this, the Jainas give the following explanation. Though there might be accepted as many propositions or formulae as there are attributes predicated of an entity, yet there is only a set of seven formulae or propositions in reference to each and every attribute. As has been explained, such a set of propositions, having the substantive (višeşya) in common, require a pair of correlative predicates which are of affirmative and negative natures. Like the afore-said example of 'existence' and 'non-existence', there can be invariably postulated
6. Though Mallisena explains four formulae only, PNT makes a detailed eluci
dation about contradictions which are supposed to result from absolute views pertaining to each formula of syādvāda, by assigning each to its corresponding doctrine of opponent systems. (PNT IV, 22-36).