Jaina Theory of Multiple Facets of Reality and Truth

SR No.: 001746
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Nagin J Shah
Publisher: B L Institute of Indology
Publication Year: 2000
Total Pages: 168
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, & Nyay
File Size: 12 MB

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A Study of Syadvāda
is to imply all possible stand-points and widen the scope of discourse. In this case, 'syāť' is not taken as verb (√ as opt. third, sg.), but as indeclinable particle signifying 'somehow' or 'in some respect' (kathamcit) However, it does not mean that syādvāda is invariably accompanied by the term 'syat'. As the term 'eva' is used only when the emphasis is laid on limitation or exclusion, so can the term 'syāť be omitted in each formula, when it is fully apprehended that the purport of the term is implicitly understood therein. (RA IV, 15; SBT pp.30-31)
First Formula
In a proposition like 'A pot simply exists in some respect' (syād asty eva ghaṭaḥ), what does it mean by 'in some respect'? The existence of any entity is affirmed by way of its intrinsical (sva-) properties, and is negated with regard to its alien (para-) properties. And such properties denote substance (dravya), place (kṣetra), time (kāla) and nature (bhāva, rupa). Thus every entity like a pot etc. exists from one point of view viz. in view of its own substance, time, place or nature, while it does not exist in respect of substance etc. of other entity. For instance, a pot does exist as its own substance or earthen substance (pārthiva) etc., but does not exist as anything else's substance or as watery substance etc. With regard to 'place', a thing does exist as belonging to Pataliputra, but does not exist as belonging to Kanyakubja. In reference to 'time', a thing does exist in winter, but does not exist in summer. And similarly in respect of 'nature', a thing does exist as being black, but does not exist as being white. Or otherwise, it will, through incidence of other properties, cease to have its intrinsical properties. (RA IV, 15; SBT pp.30-31)
Second Formula
As the 'existence' is affirmed from its intrinsical substance (sva-dravya) etc. in the first formula of syādvāda, so is the 'non-existence' of an entity is asserted in the second formula, like 'A pot does not exist in some respect' (syan nasty eva ghaṭaḥ). In case this be not accepted, the entity might cease to possess its own character, since it has no definite character and can exist as anything else. That is, if it is not
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