Jaina Theory of Multiple Facets of Reality and Truth

SR No.: 001746
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Nagin J Shah
Publisher: B L Institute of Indology
Publication Year: 2000
Total Pages: 168
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, & Nyay
File Size: 12 MB

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Jaina Theory of Multiple Facets of Reality and Truth logical accuracy and subtlety even as compared with the technical devices employed by the Navya-nyāya. Yet, this 'eva' can be somehow formulated as follows:
(Vx) {Sv>P(x)} The second 'eva' is intended for 'exclusion of relatedness to other thing' and is shown in a stock example like 'Only Pārtha (=Arjuna) is the archer' (pārtha eva dhanur-dharaḥ). The purport of this definition rests in 'exclusion of anything other than substantive', which is again paraphrased as 'exclusion of the identity etc. with anything other than substantive' (višeşya-bhinna-tādātmyādi-vyavaccheda). When the definition and its additional qualification (parişkāra) are applied to the above example, it means 'The archer has the negation of identity with anybody other than Pārtha (=Arjuna)', or in other words, 'Arjuna is none other than archer who has the negation of identity with Arjuna'. Though this definition cannot exactly be formulated symbolically, yet the second 'eva' is, roughly speaking, equivalent to a particular case of 'universal affirmative judgment', denotations of both (S and P) utterly overlapping each other (sama-vyäpti).
-(Vx) {-5(x)=P(x)} (x) {Six)=P(x)} The symbol '' here does not signify logically rigid implication. The former formulation represents the textual interpretation, and the latter one stands for a particular case of universal affirmative judgment' or sama-vyāpti.
The third kind of 'eva' which is intended for 'exclusion of absolute non-relatedness' is shown in a stock example like 'The lotus simply is blue' (nilaṁ sarojam bhavaty eva). This is defined as 'not being counterpositive of negation which pervades determinant of substantive' (uddeśyatāvacchedaka-vyāpakāpratiyogitva). In the present context, the determinant of substantiveness is ‘lotusness', because the purport of the verb 'asti' refers to the thing limited by the determinant viz. lotus. The negation which pervades 'lotusness' is absolute negation, and not a mere negation of non-distinction of blue, since non-distinction of blue might exist in some lotus. Such being the case, the example of negation in question should be sought in the negation of a pot (anyābhāva) etc. Thus the counterpositiveness invariably exists in the non-distinction of blue. That is, the desired non-counterpositive