Jaina Theory of Multiple Facets of Reality and Truth

SR No.: 001746
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Nagin J Shah
Publisher: B L Institute of Indology
Publication Year: 2000
Total Pages: 168
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, & Nyay
File Size: 12 MB

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The Jaina Theory of Anekanta
indeed be conceded that the determinateness of a related term does not in point of being depend on its relations: the relation of a term presupposes an intrinsic determination in the term. But that need not mean that the term is itself unrelated and has relation only added to it. In point of being the relation of samavāya is eternal and so the related term is never unrelated, though as a term it is distinguishable from the relation. Relation then as an unrelated term is not even determinate and it is a contradiction to speak of it as self-related or unrelated and yet as determinate.
15. In the two conceptions of identity-in-difference above considered, the subordination of either relation to the other appears to lead to a contradiction. Shall we then take the relations to be merely coordinate? We may take one type of such a view as presented by W. E. Johnson (Logic, Vol. I. Chapter vii). In the last two views, a term A can be both identical with and other than B. The present view denies it and keeps to the common-sense principle that distincts cannot be also non-distinct. Yet identity as a relation is admitted: a term X, viewed in connexion with the distincts A and B, would be said to be identical as against the distinction of A and B. Identity of X here practically means its self-identity: it is not merely the thing X but a relation in reference to the distinction. Identity of X thus implies a distinction outside X, viz., between A and B, not any distinction or plurality within itself.
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16. The so-called mutual implication of the identity and distinction of two terms M and N means, according to this view, their identity in one respect a and their distinction in another b; the two relations are presented together, each being known independently. It amounts to saying that M and N are in the two relations the same two terms only in a factitious sense. They are two pairs of terms-Ma, Na and Mb, Nb-presented together; and the identity of Ma, Na, means that they are only different symbols of P.
17. But what does 'symbol of P' mean, it may be asked. Can we simply say that Ma, Na, are P as in connexion with i.e., as distinct from and together with Mb, Nb, respectively? Apparently P has to be thought in two positions. The difference of symbols is not accidentally together with the identity P: it cannot be got rid of and cannot in the last resort