Jaina Theory of Multiple Facets of Reality and Truth

SR No.: 001746
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Nagin J Shah
Publisher: B L Institute of Indology
Publication Year: 2000
Total Pages: 168
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, & Nyay
File Size: 12 MB

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Jaina Theory of Multiple Facets of Reality and Truth
unconditionality and categoricality of any predication, except perhaps the ultimate one, anekānta in this case, is denied, then this is a generalized position. The only way to counter it would be to find a counter-example, that is, an absolute, unconditionally applicable, totally unambiguous and categorically assertible predicate, or a set of such predicates, without giving in to some dogma or having some unsuspected and unrecognized presupposition. The Jainas believe that this cannot be found. Hence anekānta.
Haribhadra and other Jaina philosophers have argued that we do not often realize, although we implicitly believe, that application of any predicate is guided by the consideration of some particular sense or criterion (excessive familiarity with the criterion or sense makes it almost invisible, so to say). This is not exactly the Fregean Sinn. In the Indian context, there is a well-entrenched tradition of talking about the basis' or the 'criterion' for the application of a predicate or a term. This can be called the NIMITTA theory (the 'basis' or the 'criterion' theory). A predicate can be truly applied to something * in virtue of a particular or a specific basis. The philosopher, when he emphasizes upon the particularity or specificity of such a basis, indirectly and implicity commits himself to the possibility of denying that predicate (i.e., of applying the contradictory predicate) to the same thing, x, in virtue of a different basis or criterion. Haribhadra says, (p.44):
(The Opponent says:) The lack of existence in virtue of being a watery substance etc., belongs to a particular earth-substance, a pot; however, this is because the locus of non-existence of something cannot be a fiction. We admit, therefore, that it is the particularity of the earth-substance, the pot, that excludes the possibility of its being existent as a water-substance (this does not amount to admitting the co-presence of existence and non-existence in one locus).
(The Jaina answer:) Oh, how great is the confusion! By your own words, you have stated the anckānta, but you do not even recognize it yourself! Existence in virtue of being an earth-substance itself specifies its non-existence in virtue of being a water
Cus).