Jaina Theory of Multiple Facets of Reality and Truth

SR No.: 001746
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Nagin J Shah
Publisher: B L Institute of Indology
Publication Year: 2000
Total Pages: 168
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, & Nyay
File Size: 12 MB

Page 24

Jaina Theory of Multiple Facets of Reality and Truth part of the argument. To answer criticism, however, they try to show how contradictory pairs of predicates can be applied to the same subject with impunity and without sacrificing rationality or intelligibility. This may be called the third part of their argument. I shall comment on the last by following an outstanding Jaina philosopher of 9th century A. D., Haribhadra. In another section, I shall discuss the first part, the sevenfold predication before concluding with some general comments.
In his Anekāntajayapatākā (=“The Banner of Victory for Anekānta"), Haribhadra formulates the opponents' criticism as follows (we will be concerned with only a few pages of the first chapter). He first selects the pair: sattva 'existence' or 'being' and asattua 'non-existence' or ‘non-being'. The opponent says (p.11, G.O.S, 1940 edn.):
“Existence is invariably located by excluding non-existence, and non-existence by excluding existence. Otherwise, they would be non-distinct from each other. Therefore, if something is existent, how can it be non-existent? For, occurrence of existence and non-existence in one place is incompatible....
Moreover, if we admit things to be either existent or nonexistent, existence and non-existence are admitted to be properties of things. One may ask: are the property and its locus, the thing, different from each other? Or are they identical? Or, both identical and different? If different, then, since the two are incompatible, how the same thing can be both? If identical, then the two properties, existence and non-existence, would be identical... And if so, how can you say that the same thing has two
different) natures?” (p.11-12). The main point of the argument here depends upon reducing the Jaina position to two absurd and unacceptable consequences. If the properties (or the predicates) are incompatible (and different), they cannot characterize the same entity. And if they are somehow shown to be not incompatible, the Jainas lose their argument to show that the same entity is or can be characterized by two incompatible properties. Haribhadra continues: