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CHAPTER 1
ANEKĀNTA: BOTH YES AND NO
B.K. Matilal
A metaphysical thesis, in the context of classical Indian philosophy at least, usually (more often than not) takes the form of such a proposition as 'Everything is F' or 'Nothing is F'. Philosophical rivalry springs from the varieties of such proposed positions, that is, varieties of such F's. For example, the Advaita Vedānta says; 'Everything is Brahman', the Mādhyamika, 'Everything is empty of its own-being or own-nature', and the Yogācāra, 'Everything is a vijñapti 'making of consciousness.' We may add to the list even such positions as ‘Everything is non-soul, impermanent and suffering' (the Buddhist
general), and 'Everything is knowable and namable' (the NyāyaVaisesika). If we have to add the Jainas to the list, then we can say that theirs is: Everything is 'non-one-sided' anekānta. However, I shall argue that at least on one standard interpretation, the Jaina thesis is held at a slightly different level; if the others are called metaphysical, this one may be called meta-metaphysical. The sense of it will be clear later on. I do not wish to claim this to be the 'one-up-manship’ of the Jainas. The claim here is a modest one; it harks back upon the historical origin of the position.
It is rather hard to see how such metaphysical theses as illustrated above, in the form of 'Everything is F', can be proven in a straightforward manner. They are often presuppositions, sometimes accepted as an axiom of a system. The argument, if there is any, must be
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