Jaina Theory of Multiple Facets of Reality and Truth

SR No.: 001746
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Nagin J Shah
Publisher: B L Institute of Indology
Publication Year: 2000
Total Pages: 168
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, & Nyay
File Size: 12 MB

Page 124

106
Jaina Theory of Multiple Facets of Reality and Truth
Moreover, if a thing is somehow said as possessing twofold nature on the basis of that thing being a substratum of two attributes, then also it cannot be described as being of twofold nature by referring to its own nature and to that of another. For example, there is a lotus which is blue, this lotus may be stated as having twofold nature i.e. lotusness and blueness. However it is not so called by referring to the nature of something else, but by referring to the nature of its own. Similarly a thing may be described as existent and non-existent exclusively by referring to its own nature.97
Neither existence nor non-existence of a thing can be described in the primary sense by referring to the nature of another thing. Indeed we cannot state that gold etc. are existent due to the form of clay, etc. Nor can we say that a sky-flower is non-existent from the viewpoint of the form of pillar etc., because it is non-existent owing to its own nature.
Hence if a positive thing is somehow regarded as possessing twofold nature, then it should be so exclusively due to its own nature, e.g. a thing may be said as a pot and non-pot both on the basis of its own nature. And if it is granted that a pot can be described as non-pot on the basis of the nature of another thing; then also that state of being non-pot should be taken in the secondary sense; just as we secondarily describe a boy as fire and a man as lion. Hence when an object is described as possessing twofold nature, that description should be taken in the secondary sense. But so far as the primary meaning of the word is concerned, a thing of whatever nature it is, is so determined exclusively on the basis of its own nature, and the thing should be taken as possessing that nature alone. 48
Again, it may be argued that an object can be described as possessing twofold nature on the basis of its own nature. But this argument cannot be maintained. For, there would arise the contingency of all practical dealings of human beings coming to standstill, as it would not be possible to ascertain the nature of things whether it is desired or undesired. For example, the people desire the presence of pleasure
47. Ibid, p.559. 48. Ibid, p.559.