Jaina Theory of Multiple Facets of Reality and Truth

SR No.: 001746
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Nagin J Shah
Publisher: B L Institute of Indology
Publication Year: 2000
Total Pages: 168
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, & Nyay
File Size: 12 MB

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Jaina Theory of Multiple Facets of Reality and Truth
about difference in cognitions also. Similarly, a particular kind of relation between negation and a positive thing produces difference in cognition.39 Hence the cognition that 'a pot is not a cloth' does not prove that the pot is of twofold nature.
It is true that the apprehension of negation is dependent upon something else, i.e. its counterpart. As the counterpart-of-negation is presented in the cognition, exactly so arises the cognition of its negation. As for example, when a pot is presented in the mind as lying on the ground, the negation or absence of that pot also comes to the mind as subsisting on the ground, e.g. there is no pot here on the ground. 40
And if the counterpart, e.g. a pot is presented in the mind as being identical with a cloth, then the negation of the pot also comes to the mind as if being identical with the cloth, e.g. the cloth is not the pot. It is therefore concluded that a positive thing and the negation of anything else cannot be identical. 41
And it was stated by Akalanka that potness and non-potness were not mutually different from each other. 42 But this statement should be taken as made by an extremely deluded person. If somehow, the non-difference between injunctory and prohibitory statements is admitted, then it would be contradicted by the universal cognition of the difference between the two.
Even if we take into consideration the view which holds the negation of two types, i.e. prasajya-pratiședha (negation of applicable) and paryudāsa-pratisedha (negation signifying exclusion of something), then the non-difference between a pot and non-cloth cannot be explained. In the case of prasajya-pratiședha, the negation of potness is itself the state of non-pot. And a thing whatever it is, cannot be the negation of itself. If the absence of a serpent is also the serpent, then a man would be afraid of the absence of a serpent also, just as he is afraid of a serpent. And if it is so admitted, then there should be no difference
39. Ibid, p.558. 40. Ibid, p.558. 41. Ibid, p.558. 42. Ibid, p.558.