Jaina Theory of Multiple Facets of Reality and Truth

SR No.: 001746
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Nagin J Shah
Publisher: B L Institute of Indology
Publication Year: 2000
Total Pages: 168
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, & Nyay
File Size: 12 MB

Page 119

Nyāya Criticism of Anekānta
101
even a modification such as bracelet etc. is different from gold-shape, i.e. the underlying substance, just as a donkey is different from camel.24
Again, it may be argued that there may be a difference, but we cannot say that there is a difference alone, because the anekānta could be applied to difference also. Accordingly, may be there is somehow a difference and so on. Thus the whole world is pervaded by anekānta; and no instance is found to corroborate the ekānta view.25
But this is not proper. There is certainly an example to establish the ekānta. The nature of Jina, of being emancipated and omniscient is absolutely different from the lower types of nature belonging to a donkey, a camel, a boar and the like.25 And the Jaina thinker cannot apply the anekānta here also. It cannot be said-May be the emancipated Jina is somehow the lowest type of soul, may be he is somehow not so and so on. And if someone insists on the saptabhangī being applied here also, then that assertion would not please the mind of the learned, because it is bereft of scriptural and logical ground as well as it is stated in the spur of competition with jealousy. 27
Besides, if the Jaina thinkers are prepared to worship a donkey, a camel, a pig etc. as they worship Jina, or if they are ready to eat stones, excreta etc. as they take gur, curd, butter-milk etc, then the doctrine of ekānta can never be established. But that is not so. Hence it is proved that the anekānta cannot be applied everywhere. 28
And if in order to escape from the difficulty mentioned above, it is accepted that there is sometime ekānta, there is sometime anekānta, then the alternative that 'there is sometime ekānta' itself becomes an example to prove the ekānta.29
Also ekānta can be established on the sound basis of inference. Whatever is different from something else, it is different absolutely,
24. Ibid, p.556. 25. Ibid, p.557. 26. Ibid, p.557. 27. Ibid, p.557. 28. Ibid, p.557. 29. Ibid, p.557.