Concept of Pancasila in Indian Thaought

SR No.: 001666
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Kamla Jain
Publisher: P V Research Institute Varanasi
Publication Year: 1983
Total Pages: 290
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Religion, & Principle
File Size: 16 MB

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The Concept of Pañcasila in Indian Thought
for purging of the offence of intoxication as given in various Smộtis. In Buddhism, the expounder of middle-path, it seems, abstinence from intoxication is pronounced for the laity more than non-possession (as promulgated by Jainas) because it is a simpler and more exoteric virtue.
Non-possession, on the other hand, is fundamentally necessary for any monastic system. The essence of monastic life lies in acceptance of this virtue, even if Buddhism does not admit it as a precept of the laymen, but its spirit has been there in the monastic discipline. It is, however, clear that a virtue like this is difficult to be traced out in the Brāhmaṇical trend which has a socialistic basis of morality. As soon as the cult of renunciation gained strength it also entered into the later developments of Brāhmaṇism. The precept of partial non-possession of the laity as pronounced in Jainism does throw some light on the social organization and gives recognition to possessions. But this recognition of possessions is different from that of the Brāhmaṇical trend which gives supremacy to social organization itself. The householder's precept insists on limitation of possessions, which is the kernel of renunciation. Herein lies the spirit of voluntary socialism rather than forced socialism.
These principles present the universal code of ethics, but in practice it is seen that they remain nothing more than a code of schismatic ethics. Each sect, even if essentially believing in them, differs with all others on certain minor points and this mild difference gains much intensity, sometimes as to create acute conflicts and controversies. In this manner schismatic ethics becomes even more powerful than the universal ethics. The reason of this fact again lies in the enigmatic human nature. The two constituents of human mind, rationality and sensationality, are so curiously mixed that it is difficult to say which of them really justifies an action, and in what circumstances a certain action is justified. The so-called immoral actions may be moral in essence, while the appa