Jaina World of Non Living

SR No.: 001658
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: N L Jain
Publisher: Parshwanath Vidyapith
Publication Year: 2000
Total Pages: 306
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, Tattvartha Sutra, Tattvartha Sutra, & Tattvarth
File Size: 17 MB

Page 78

The Jaina world of Non-living
Q. Let, then, the definition of the reality be taken as being the aggregate, group or multitude of attributes and nothing else.
A. It is also not correct as there seems to be no difference between the subject and object. For the advocates of this definition, it could be said that neither the attributes nor their group is different from reality which may address the subject-object relationship. It is not very correct to state that subject-object relationship is observable in non-difference as in the case of self-illuminating lamp. There should be some difference as we realise the reality and its colour differently. If there is absolute nondifference, then, either all the reality should be in the form of colour alone or the reality should always have the same colour. However, we see different colours (black etc.) in realities and materials.
Secondly, it is not proper to postulate 'group of attribute' concept as they are not observed separately. It is only the materials like grains etc. which have different forms and groups. Similarly, the concept of qualitative attributes does also not seem to be logical as they are adjectives qualifying the objects. There cannot be any attribute-ness of attributes without the objects.
However, it may be asked whether the group of attributes could be (1) different or (2) non-different from the attributes or (3) it could be indescribable? The defects of the first two alternatives have already been indicated. In the third alternative, there is contrariety of one's own statement. If there is a group and it is indescribable, it may not be a group at all. Only an existent has names. The indescribable is beyond speech expressions, hence it could be equivalent to a non-existent, it will mean as the words of the fools.
However, if attributes are describable and their grouping is not so, it leads to difference between attributes and their grouping.
Moreover, if objects are assumed to be groups of atoms of colour etc., they may not develop the properties of visibility etc. as the atoms are invisible. Thus, the tangibility of any object may be a confusion only. If it is called correct, there will be no difference between direct and inferential knowledge and pseudo-direct and pseudo-inferential knowledge.
73