Jaina World of Non Living

SR No.: 001658
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: N L Jain
Publisher: Parshwanath Vidyapith
Publication Year: 2000
Total Pages: 306
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, Tattvartha Sutra, Tattvartha Sutra, & Tattvarth
File Size: 17 MB

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The Jaina world of Non-living
those entities which reside permanently in the reality. As the modes are occasional, they are not included here. Thus, permanently associated characteristics are called attributes. These may be exemplified by existence etc. and knowledge, conation etc. of the living entities. The non-livingness etc. and colour etc. are attributes of mattergic reality. The knowledge about pitcher etc. are modes of the living while transformations of earth into jar, cup etc. are modes of mattergy. Supplementary Notes 1. The commentary deals with the following points: (a) The word 'substratum' may be referred to either as a locative case or accusative case. (b) The logical support for the two terms defining the attributes : (i) The term reality serving as substratum (of attributes) is there to (a) exclude the possibility of modes like pot etc. to be called attributes as they are substratum for touch, colour etc. and they are also attributeless. In fact, this term becomes superfluous as it is an undisputed fact that attributes cannot be without substratum. Its utility is, therefore, to define the term in such a way that modes are excluded. This definition is that attributes are ever-coexisting properties of a reality. The modes are, on the other hand, casual or changing forms. (b) The term 'attributeless' is meant for excluding the possibility of diatomic entities being called as attributes as their substratums are atoms. However, as they have attributes of colour etc., they are material effects. 2. Vidyānanda has pointed out that the term 'reality serving as substratum' has another use. It excludes the possibility of attributes being called as 'realities because they are substratum for qualities like attributeness, colourness etc. This concept will lead to the negation of attribute-attributed relationship. They are not substrates of realities but of attributes themselves. Moreover, the basic attributes cannot be as figurative as the above ones because figuration is not possible in the absence of basic attributes. 3. The scholars have distinguished between attributes and modes. The attributes are coexisting with realities while modes are occurring in succession.
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