Jaina View of Life

SR No.: 001622
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: T G Kalghatgi
Publisher: Jain Sanskruti Samrakshak Sangh Solapur
Publication Year: 1984
Total Pages: 260
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, & Discourse
File Size: 14 MB

Page 46

Approach to Reality
31 Syādvāda, says “Yet in our opinion the Jaina logic leads to a monistic idealism (by which he means the hypothesis of the absolute') and so far as the Jainas shrink from it they are untrue to their own logic“.89 But in the Saptabhangi tarangiņi we read a counter argument: If the final release and heavenly bliss are eternal and existing, where is the chance for samsāra and the attempt to obtain mokşa ? If the other alternative is the only truth, what is the purpose of preaching such an ideal which is impossible to attain ? Radhakrishnan points out that the Saptabhangi doctrine is not inconsistent with the other views of the Jainas. It is a logical corollary of the Anekāntavāda. All that the Jainas say is that everything is of a complex nature and the real reconciles the difference in itself. Attributes which are contradictory in the abstract co-exist in the world of experience.
Ramānuja also pointed out that contradictory attributes such as existence and non-existence cannot at the same time belong to one thing any more than light and darkness. However, he seems to accept the distinction between dravya and paryaya, substance and modes. He also sees that the substance has permanence; paryāya implied change.
But the predications give severally partial truths. The truths presented by them are alternative truths from different points of view; and the seven predications would present a complete comprehensive picture of reality. It is neither scepticism nor agnosticism, for each individual truth is valid. It is supplemented and harmonised by the other predication into a single comprehensive picture of reality, as we get a harmony in orchestra by the combination of different notes.
With all their criticisms, Belvalkar makes Syıdvāda a most searching characteristic. Radhakrishnan observes “Samkara and Rāmānuja criticise the Saptabhangi view on the ground of
39. Radhakrishnan (S.): Indian Philosophy, Vol. I (Allen and Unwin)
1931, p. 305