Reals on the Jaina Metaphysics

SR No.: 001619
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Harisatya Bhattacharya
Publisher: Shatnidas Khetsy Charitable Trust Mumbai
Publication Year: 1966
Total Pages: 430
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, Religion, & Epistemology
File Size: 8 MB

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The Problem of Reals mena of our experience, it does not follow that these phenomena must have the non-psychical principle of Pradhāna as their cause in which the attributes have their abode and which at the same time is eternal, non-dual and all-pervasive. 3. The third argument, faia: ganze has its force where the producer is a conscious active agent. A person who is conscious of his capacity to do something, sets his hands to it. So, from the premises that the non-psychical things of our experience are products one may conclude not that the unconscious Pradhāna is their cause but that a conscious agent is at their back. 4. The next argument ATROFrüfattia does not show that the Pradhāna is necessarily the sole cause of the unconscious phenomena of our experience. 5. The Sāṁkhya argument 37fHTTIGTECTE is also is not sound. For, in the first place, the Pralaya or cosmic dissolution is not an event which is admitted by all. Then again at the time of the alleged dissolution, do the natures of non-psychical principles of Mahat etc., continue or do they not? It they continue there is no Pralaya. If they do not, then there is an absolute end of them, which the Sāṁkhya does not admit. Lastly, the Sāmkhya view about 3f TT at the time of the Pralaya is self-contradictory. If you say that the Pradhāna is the cause of the a 59760 i.e. of the existing world, then this world becomes one homogeneous whole like its cause, the undifferentiated Pradhāna; and if that be so, how can we talk of any indistinguishableness, at all, of different principles of Mahat etc. at the time of the Pralaya, seeing that the hypothesis of the Pradhāna has already wiped off all heterogeneity from this world?
The Jainas thus while agreeing with the philosophers of the Sāmkhya school with respect to the doctrine of the multiplicity of conscious Reals repudiate their theory of the non-dual character of the non-psychical principle. They maintain that the unconscious Reals are more than one in number and in this respect their theory is to some extent similar to the position of the NyāyaVaiseșika.