Reals on the Jaina Metaphysics

SR No.: 001619
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Harisatya Bhattacharya
Publisher: Shatnidas Khetsy Charitable Trust Mumbai
Publication Year: 1966
Total Pages: 430
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, Religion, & Epistemology
File Size: 8 MB

Page 393

11
ey
378
Reats in the faina Metaphysics is possible and that there are omniscient beings. They, however, do not admit that the world-evolving Praksti of the Sāmkhya school is an omniscient principle. They are also opposed to the theistic doctrines of the Seśvara Sāmkhya as well as of the Nyāya-Vaiseșika systems. The Jaina's repudiate the theory of God as the First Cause or the Architect of the universe. Shortly put, their arguments (as described by the commentator of the Pramāna-nayatattvālokālamkāra) are as follows:-"The thinkers of the Nyāya school contend that omniscience is not possible in a man like the Arhat but that it is possible only in the Lord who has created the things of the universe. These theistic philosophers argue that the earth, the hill etc, in question are determined (i.e. created, in some sense) by an intelligent being; for, their coming into existence is due to a cause; that their co
ence is due to a cause, is determined by an intelligent being; for instance, a temple; such is the case here; so it is. In criticism of the above Nyāya theory, the Jaina's point to the two aspects of a thing viz:-its essential substance and its modes. So far as their substance is concerned the Jaina's contend that the things of the universe e.g. the earth, the mountain etc. are certainly uncreate and eternal, so that we cannot talk of any causes bringing them into existence. The Naiyāyika's urge that all things have parts and that from this fact it follows that they must have a beginning in existence. The Jaina philosophers point out that such a line of argument would go to establish that a soul (which is admittedly an uncreate and eternal substance) has also a beginning in existence. It is argued that not the essential substance of a thing but its modes have a beginning in existence and that from this it follows that the thing in question must be determined by an intelligent being. The Jaina's point out that a soul sometimes manifests itself as a god, sometimes as a man and so on, so that it has various impermanent modes. But it would be illogical to conclude from this that a soul is created by an intelligent being. The further objection of the Jaina's to the theory of an omniscient creator of the things of the universe is that