Reals on the Jaina Metaphysics

SR No.: 001619
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Harisatya Bhattacharya
Publisher: Shatnidas Khetsy Charitable Trust Mumbai
Publication Year: 1966
Total Pages: 430
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, Religion, & Epistemology
File Size: 8 MB

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Reals in the Jaina Metaphysics
possibility of omniscience. Anumana is based on the invariable relationship between the Hetu and the Sadhya. You yourself say that you have no experience of omniscience; how then can you get a Hetu, which may be (negatively) connected with it? Hence in trying to refute the doctrine of omniscience, Anumāna rather posits it. The Commentator Ratnaprabhāçārrya shows how "the Lord Varddhamāna may be proved to be an omniscient being. The Hetuor reason which establishes omniscience in the Lord is not fallacious. The facts that the Lord Varddhamāna's knowledge was not confined within a small number of objects, that he did not teach about only a limited number of objects, that he did not observe only a small number of objects, that the hindrances to his knowledge did all totally subside, that he was free from attachment and envy, that what he taught were not opposed to the Pramāņa's, that his being a teacher and his being an omniscient being are not facts contradictory of each other,these facts and similar evidence conclusively determine that the Hetu establishing omniscience in the Lord Varddhamāna is perfectly faultless, according to the rules of logic. Hence Anumana is not opposed to the possibility of omniscience; it rather proves that the Lord Varddhamana at least was an omniscient being. Next, it cannot be argued that Sabda or scriptural authority is opposed to the possibility of omniscience. What kind of scripture is it that opposes omniscience? If you say that it is Apauruşeya or not-man-made scripture, we answer that there cannot be any such scripture. If, however, you say that it is 'manmade' scripture, we say that in order that such a scripture may be authoritative, it must be revealed by a being who is omniscient (in which case, the possibility of omniscience is proved by the scripture itself); if it is not revealed by such an absolutely wise and omniscient being, we cannot accept its doctrines. Arthāpatti, as we have seen, proves a fact by offering an explanation which could not be put forward by the other Pramāņa's. Upamāna or analogy deals with similarity and similars. None of these obviously has anything
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