Reals on the Jaina Metaphysics

SR No.: 001619
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Harisatya Bhattacharya
Publisher: Shatnidas Khetsy Charitable Trust Mumbai
Publication Year: 1966
Total Pages: 430
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, Religion, & Epistemology
File Size: 8 MB

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Reals in the Faina Metaphysics contrary that omniscience implies a knowledge, not of all. things but of some principal things only, it may be pointed out that this presupposes omniscience or a knowledge of all things first, out of which some competent principal things are to be selected for cognition. Lastly, with respect to the omniscient being, it may be asked: How is he to know the past and the future? The past and the future are not present and as such, they are non-existent. A knowledge of non-existent things cannot be Pramāņa or a valid knowledge. If it be said that the omniscient knows the things of the past and the future as things of the present time, his knowledge of those things would then not be correct.
It may not be worthy of credit to the uninformed Hindus but is nevertheless true that the Mimāmsaka's who are the most orthodox and firm supporters of the Vedas, deny the existence not only of the omniscient but also of the Creator. In none of the communities, Moslem, Christian or Jewish can be found such unperturbed faith in the scripture or the Revelation, in close alliance with atheism, as characterises the Indian Mimāṁsā school.
JAINA REFUTATION OF THE MIMĀMSĀ THEORY
The Jaina's on the contrary maintain that omniscience is not only possible but that it is a potentiality in all souls, which has been acutally realised in the Arhat's. They point that the Vira-vardhamāna and other Arhat's were all-knowing perfect beings. In criticism of the Mimāṁsā objections, Ratnaprabhācāryya urges that "Pratyaksa is. either transcendental or practical. The transcendental perception again is either incomplete or complete. The incomplete transcendental perception is either clairvoyance or telepathy. Neither of these, however, opposes the possibility of omniscience, in as much as they deal with things having 'form' and 'mental substance' respectively. It goes. without saying that the complete transcendental perception which is omniscience itself cannot be said to oppose the possibility of omniscience. Coming to the practical perception, we may say that neither of its two modes viz:--the