Reals on the Jaina Metaphysics

SR No.: 001619
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Harisatya Bhattacharya
Publisher: Shatnidas Khetsy Charitable Trust Mumbai
Publication Year: 1966
Total Pages: 430
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, Religion, & Epistemology
File Size: 8 MB

Page 36

21
The Problem of Reals developed arguments to establish that all things were but void and unsubstantial.
ŠŪNYA-VĀDA ARGUMENTS
They began by pointing out the obvious fact that a thing as it appears to us at a particular moment, an earthen jar, for instance, decays after a time; therefore, the gross thing, the earthen jar is unquestionably not a permanent substance. We cannot say, again, that the atoms constituting the jar are permanent. We have no direct knowledge Ture of the atoms, as they are admittedly supersensuous; nor can we by means of inference 3779TT be ever sure of the nature of a substance which originally does not submit to our senses. The Buddhists contend: Supposing an atom is an eternal reality, how is it to produce actual results (reff$479rfia) which is the sole test of reality? If the atom is to produce the compounds, one after the other, what becomes of it as it is in itself? If you say that it changes its nature in the act of producing its compounds, one after the other, then the atom cannot be said to have a permanent nature. If, on the contrary, it is held that the atom does not change its nature while it goes on producing compounds, A, B and C, how is it that A precedes B, B precedes C and not that the order is otherwise? If in producing its compounds, the atom be held to remain unchanged, one may reasonably expect that all the compounds of atoms should be produced all at once, for there is no reason why they should come out successively. Similar lines of arguments are brought forward by the Buddhists for establishing their position that there would be serious inconsistencies if you hold atoms to be permanent in essence. Thus the gross things of our experience are obviously impermanent; and their subtle constituents also cannot be eternal. The result is that every thing outside us is impermanent and as such, unreal. Our cognitions of these unreal things and for the matter of that, we ourselves, the cognising subjects are consequently unreal. The Buddhist conclusion is that all is Sūnya, i.e. there are no Reals at all.