Reals on the Jaina Metaphysics

SR No.: 001619
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Harisatya Bhattacharya
Publisher: Shatnidas Khetsy Charitable Trust Mumbai
Publication Year: 1966
Total Pages: 430
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, Religion, & Epistemology
File Size: 8 MB

Page 358

Sout
positive and the existential aspect of a thing, the Vijñānavadin's and the Śūṇyavādin's fixed upon its negative and the non-existential aspect. The views of both the schools are one-sided and incomplete. The Jaina's would appeal to experience and point out that a real is existent in some respects and in some respects it is non-existent
too.
SUNYA AS CONCEIVED BY THE MADHYAMIKA
The Madhyamika school of Buddhist thinkers are generally classed as Sūņyavādin's, although they do not positively assert that a real thing is a nothing. They call a real, Šūṇya no doubt; their conception of Sūnya is essentially different from that of the ultra-voidist's, as noticed above. According to the Mādhyamika's. अतस्तत्त्वं सदसदुभयानु भयात्मकचतुष्कोटिविनिर्मुक्तं शून्यमेव (सर्वदर्शनसंग्रहः )
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What we call a real is (1) neither existent (2) nor non-existent (3) nor both existent and non-existent (4) nor something which is different from both existent and non-existent. The Madhyamika position is more like that of a sceptic than that of a positive nihilist.
VEDANTIC THEORY OF THE UNREALITY OF THINGS
The Vedantist's differ from the Madhyamika's by positively admitting the reality of a transcendental substance. But so far as the things of our ordinary experience are concerned, the position of the former is not very different from that of the latter. It is true that according to the Vedantist's, a thing of our experience is not wholly unsubstantial in as much as it is grounded in the transcendental reality of the Brahma. But so far as the thing is conceived by itself, it is said to be Mithya or unreal. The Vedantist's contend that a thing of our experience cannot be said to be either existent or non-existent. It is not existent because its persistence is not permanent. It is not non-existent because it has at least a temporary existence as an object of our empirical experience. A thing which is neither existent nor non