Reals on the Jaina Metaphysics

SR No.: 001619
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Harisatya Bhattacharya
Publisher: Shatnidas Khetsy Charitable Trust Mumbai
Publication Year: 1966
Total Pages: 430
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, Religion, & Epistemology
File Size: 8 MB

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Soul
noticed here. Emancipatioin is that state, according to the Jaina thinkers in which the soul exists in and to itself, in a state of bliss. The Buddhist philosophers, on the contrary look upon Nirvana as extinction or annihilation of the conscious series (Santana). The Jaina's who uphold the theory of the real existence of the soul, necessarily reject the extinction theory of Emancipation. The thinkers of the Vedanta school contend that when emancipated, the soul exists as pure existence, pure consciousness and pure bliss; no attributes remain attached to it. The theory of the Nyaya school is that in its state of Emancipation, the soul becomes devoid of its nine attributes e.g. Intelligence (Buddhi) etc. The Jaina doctrine is essentially opposed to both the Vedanta and the Nyāya contentions in as much as according to it, the essential attributes of the soul become fully manifest and explicit only when it is emancipated. The Jaina's point out that there is no reason why the psychical attributes would be severed from the soul in its state of emancipation. The Nyaya philosophers refuse to admit that the Mokṣa is a state of bliss; they describe it as a state in which there is no misery. Their contention is that pleasure or bliss is impossible without pain or misery; hence if Mokṣa be supposed to be a state of bliss, it must presuppose the existence of pain in it. It is safer accordingly to think of it as a state in which there is no misery. The Naiyayika's urge further that if Mokşa be supposed to be a state of pleasure, it becomes inattainable; for, people striving after it would be striving after the attainment of pleasure; this is Raga which blocks the way to salvation. To all these objections the Jaina reply is that the state of an emancipated soul, as conceived by the Nyāya school is no better than the state of an unfeeling stone. Unless Mokşa be a blissful state, no body would feel tempted to strive after its realisation. The Jaina's point out that to be a state of bliss, there need not be pain in Mokșa. It is Karma which brings pain to the soul which is essentially blissful; in the state of Moksa, Karma is destroyed and joy becomes explicit in the soul, as a matter of course. Lastly, the Jaina philo
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