Reals on the Jaina Metaphysics

SR No.: 001619
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Harisatya Bhattacharya
Publisher: Shatnidas Khetsy Charitable Trust Mumbai
Publication Year: 1966
Total Pages: 430
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, Religion, & Epistemology
File Size: 8 MB

Page 33

18
Reals in the Jaina Metaphysics
VALIDITY OF PURE SENSATION: THE JAINA, THE BUDDHIST AND THE NYAYA VIEWS
The next point of difference between the Jaina and the Buddhist schools about the Nirvikalpa is with respect to its validity or otherwise. The Buddhists contend, as we have already indicated, that it is the particular aspect or the absolute individuality of a thing that can be of practical utility to us. Water, as it is in itself, can be useful to a thirsty man and not the general concept of water. The test of true knowledge or the Pramāņa is whether its object is of practical utility ("'Artha-kriyā-kāri”) and since the Nirvikalpa yields that aspect of a thing which is strictly individual and as such, can be of practical use to us, it is the Pramāņa. The Savikalpa or determined Perception, mixed as it is, with Kalpanā, conception and imagination, is not a source of true knowledge.
The Jaina theory, on the contrary, is that the Nirvikalpa cannot be a Pramāņa at all. Pramāņa or true knowledge, according to the Jaina is buchtyFTHTT# i.e. it yields a knowledge which is free from all forms of doubts and misconceptions. The matter of the Pure Sensation is, as already observed, the barest or empty generality "TTATHETĘ.” according to the Jainas. It is a vague apprehension and nothing more and as such, cannot be a knowledge which is clear and free from doubts and misapprehensions'. It is the Savikalpa which is clear and rich and as such is valid knowledge according to the Tainas. . We have already quoted the Nyāya definition of the Pratyakșa which would show that to the author of the Nyāya-sūtra's both the forms of Perception, the Nirvikalpa and the Savikalpa, are correct modes of knowledge. Here again, the Nyāya theory combines the contending views of the Jaina and the Buddhist schools.
What should be the test of valid knowledge, whether as according to the Pragmatists, it is what serves useful purpose
1 The author of the Prameya-kamala-mārtanda means this when he says that Darśana or Pure Sensation is not a Pramāņa
स्पष्टाकारविकल्पत्वात् ।