Reals on the Jaina Metaphysics

SR No.: 001619
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Harisatya Bhattacharya
Publisher: Shatnidas Khetsy Charitable Trust Mumbai
Publication Year: 1966
Total Pages: 430
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, Religion, & Epistemology
File Size: 8 MB

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of argument may be put forward to the effect that if sky be confined in one pitcher, there cannot be any free sky outside it and that if there be free sky anywhere, there cannot be any confined sky anywhere. If it be said that confinement and non-confinement are simultaneously possible in the case of sky because it has parts, we may say that there is no harm in considering the one all-pervasive soul as. constituted of different parts and thus attributing Bondage and Emancipation simultaneously to it. The Jaina philosophers show in this way that if the soul be supposed to be all-permeating and all-pervasive, one need not admit its multiplicity.
The Nyāya thinkers contend that if the soul were not all-pervasive, it could not come in contact with the proper Atoms lying in infinite directions, with the result that no Body could be produced. The Jaina's point out that in order that the Atoms may be drawn towards it and joined, the soul need not be all-pervasive. Magnet draws Iron; but Magnet is not all-pervasive substance. It may be contended that if all the Atoms of infinite directions be supposed to be attracted towards the Soul, the form and magnitude of the Body becomes indefinite. The Jaina's point out that the same difficulty may arise if you suppose the soul to pervade and thereby draw all the Atoms. If it be said that owing to 'Adrsta', only those Atoms which are competent to form the Body are drawn towards the soul, the Jaina's answer that the very same thing may be urged by those who deny that the soul is all-pervasive.
NYAYA OBJECTION TO THE JAINA Theory
According to the Jaina philosophers, the soul is of the same extent as the Body. The Naiyāyika's say that if the soul be supposed to be confined within the Body, the soul like the Body must be said to have parts: if the soul be supposed to have parts, it is to be looked upon as an effect: if it be an effect, what is its cause? The soul cannot have anything which is not of the same nature with it (Vijātīya) as its cause; because it is impossible for the soul to be