Reals on the Jaina Metaphysics

SR No.: 001619
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Harisatya Bhattacharya
Publisher: Shatnidas Khetsy Charitable Trust Mumbai
Publication Year: 1966
Total Pages: 430
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, Religion, & Epistemology
File Size: 8 MB

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becomes impossible, if the soul be not identified with consciousness. For this reason, the Jaina's reject the theory of the Nyāya philosophy that the soul is essentially unconscious.
JAINA CRITICISM OF THE NYĀYA THEORY THAT THE SOUL IS ESSENTIALLY IMMUTABLE
The second Nyāya doctrine with regard to the soul is that it is eternally unchangeable i.e. absolutely immutable. "The Jaina's criticise this doctrine also and hold that the soul is subject to modification. They ask: If the soul remain the same at the time (or, rather, state) of cognition as it was before the time (or, rather state) of cognitions how can it evolve knowledge? Immutability or “Kūtastha-bhāva consists in eternal self-identity. Before knowledge arises in it, the soul is non-cognising, but at the time of the origin of knowledge in it, it is the knower,--the cogniser of objects, so that a sort of difference in the soul is undeniable between its state of non-cognising and its state of cognising. And, if there be a difference in the states of the soul, you cannot call it absolutely immutable.
JAINA CRITICISM OF THE NYAYA THEORY THAT THE SOUL IS ALL-PERVASIVE
By regarding the soul as ‘of the same extent as the Body', the Jaina philosophers have attacked the theory of the Nyāya school that the soul is 'pervasive' (Vyāpaka). They point out that if the soul be held to be all-pervasive, one need not maintain the doctrine of the plurality of souls, Minds (Manas) are admittedly many; souls are inferred to be many as they are attached to these Minds. But if the soul be an all-permeating pervasive substance, its contact with many Minds at one and the same time may be possible, like that of the one, all-pervasive Sky with the many pitchers. If the soul be all-informing, its contact with the varied Bodies and senses at one and the same time would be similarly possible. There would thus be no necessity for admitting the multiplicity of the souls. If it be contended that the contact of the one soul with the varied Bodies etc. at one