Reals on the Jaina Metaphysics

SR No.: 001619
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Harisatya Bhattacharya
Publisher: Shatnidas Khetsy Charitable Trust Mumbai
Publication Year: 1966
Total Pages: 430
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, Religion, & Epistemology
File Size: 8 MB

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feel itself finite. We say, the soul has Pramāņa or right knowledge, Viparyaya or false knowledge, Vikalpa or dubitation, Nidrā or sleep and Smộti or recollection. Really, however, the soul has nothing of these; it is the Manas which has these five Vrttis or functions. In short, Jñāna or finite apprehension is the attribute of Manas and as such knowledge is possible only through Manas, it may be regarded as a Karaņa or sense-organ. Manas as the principle characterised by Sankalpa evolves from Ahankāra and is consequently non-eternal. Even if Manas be identified with Mahat or Ahankāra, it is nevertheless non-eternal, because all things other than Prakřti and Purușa,--i.e. things which have their origin, have their annihilations, according to the Sāṁkhya philosophers. Manas cannot be regarded as a substance having no parts. In the matter of the generation of sensuous knowledge, it must be supposed to come in contact with the various sense-organs, so that it must have various parts. The Sāmkhya philosophers are opposed to the Mīmāmsā doctrine that Manas is Vibhu or an allpervading principle. It is only a Karaņa or Indriya i.e. a sense-organ and as such, it does not pervade even the whole of the body. It is said that the simultaneous feelings of pain in the head and pleasure in the foot show that Manas pervades the whole body. The Sāṁkhya philosophers point out that the said feelings are not really simultaneous. They are successive and it is because Manas moves in considerable speed from one part of the body to another that we are led to feel that we have the simultaneous feelings of pleasure and pain in different parts of the body.
Vijñāna-bhikṣu, however, thinks that according to the Sāṁkhya school of philosophers, Manas is of the extent of the body. The author of the Sāmkhya Sūtra's, on the contrary, definitely says— Brocafcatur conferata:' and Aniruddha Bhațţa explains that Manas is of the atomic extent only.
JAINA'S ARE OPPOSED TO THE SAMKHYA THEORY
The Jaina philosophers are opposed to the Sāmkhya