Reals on the Jaina Metaphysics

SR No.: 001619
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Harisatya Bhattacharya
Publisher: Shatnidas Khetsy Charitable Trust Mumbai
Publication Year: 1966
Total Pages: 430
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Philosophy, Religion, & Epistemology
File Size: 8 MB

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Matter
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reality of all things including matter. In criticism of this nihilistic position, it is pointed out:--' ' TATUT प्रसिद्धो लोकस्य व्यवहारोऽन्यत्तत्वमनधिगम्य शक्यतेऽ-पह्नोत्तुम् । अपवादाभावे उत्सर्गप्रसिद्धेः।
Some sort of reality is admitted and established by all forms of knowledge; unless very cogent reasons are adduced, extreme nihilism cannot be adopted as a philosophical position.
YOGĀÇĀRA SOLIPSISM
The Buddhist Yogācāra school accordingly reject the Sūnyavāda or absolute nihilism. According to them, however, Vijñāna or mental states are the only reality. Outside mind, there is nothing real. Matter according to these subjective idealists is unreal. It is true that we talk of extramental material things. This, however, does not show that these material things have independent reality. In our dreams, we see many material things, but these are not real. Just as in our dreams, the things seen are creations of our minds, the so-called material things of our experience are really evolutions from our minds. The variety in the outside material things is determined by Väsanā or mental tendencies left by the previous states of the mind. In criticising the above solipsistic contention, the Vedānta takes up exactly the position of natural realism and says :-- TH19: 390908 : 1
Things external to our mind cannot be said to be nonexistent as there is the perception of reality.
SARVĀSTIVĀDA
The analysis of experience would show that the object of our experience is not felt to be identical with the experience itself. In the same manner, the analysis would further show that the difference of one object of our knowledge from another is felt not to consist in the difference in cognition itself; objects are felt to be different because they are felt to be different in themselves. The analogy of dreams does not hold good in the case of the objects of our percep