Structure and Functions of Soul in Jainism

SR No.: 001617
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: S C Jain
Publisher: Bharatiya Gyanpith
Publication Year: 1978
Total Pages: 272
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Epistemology, Nyay, & Spiritual
File Size: 16 MB

Page 88

84 :: Structure and Functions of Soul in Jainism
Neither Hume nor the Yogācāra propounds the philosophy of delusion. The unity they derive from the discrete cognitions and ideas is a fact of experience. Hence vāsanās or subconscious impressions must not be 'unreal, nor the laws of association contentless. As for the Yogācāra there exists nothing but cognitions, vāsanās cannot be distinct from the cognitions. So Dr. Sinha says: "vāsanā or disposition is only the latent power of cognition." Now when the cognitions are momentary they must be totally destroyed every moment with all their capacities. Vāsanās, as a power of the cognition, is, therefore, also destroyed along with the cognitions every moment. Thus vāsanā as a power of cognition fails to determine any connection among the cognitions. A cognition does not leave behind any residue which could have been taken to work as a connecting link between two cognitions. "The preceding cognition cannot impress the succeeding one before it comes into existence, and the succeeding cognition cannot be impressed by the preceding ones, since it is destroyed."? Quoting Keśava it is again said that “the preceding cognitions cannot "perfume or madalize the succeeding cognitions”3 Haribhadra has rightly said: “Without a connection with other elements a vāsanā cannot be generated, just as no perfuming of oil is possible in the absence of smell of flowers etc. There must be something distinct from the cognitions to perfume the cognitions. This something is karma for us (the Jaina), and the vāsanā is not a consistent conception if interpreted in any other way."4 "By introducing the concept of 'santāna' nothing fresh is mentioned. If it is identified with the series of momentary cognitions, its distinct existence is not established. If it is distinct from the series, it must be real. Then again it can be either permanent or momentary. If it is momentary, it is again on the same level with the momentary
1. Ibid., p. 108 2. Ibid., P. 125 3. Ibid., p. 265. 4. Haribhadra: Šāstravārtāsamuccaya (Bandha), verses 102, 103