Structure and Functions of Soul in Jainism

SR No.: 001617
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: S C Jain
Publisher: Bharatiya Gyanpith
Publication Year: 1978
Total Pages: 272
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Epistemology, Nyay, & Spiritual
File Size: 16 MB

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68 :: Structure and Functions of Soul in Jainism
the substance of the psychical structure. The introduction of psychoplasm brings us back to the position where a very fine type of matter was supposed to explain the origin of consciousness. Unless this substance is so different from matter that it may be called immaterial, it cannot prove a suitable substratum for consciousness. The very idea that we need something different from matter to explain consciousness goes to prove that the soul is a different substance from matter the soul has distinct forms of existence and comprehension and for this reason it is a distinct substance from matter, as Vidyānandin observed.
Idealistic Theories of the Soul
Just as materialism tries to derive consciousness from matter, so also idealism tries to derive matter from the principle of consciousness. Though idealism takes varied forms, the common conception underlying them is that the ultimate reality is spiritual in nature. For the present purpose, the idealistic theories may be classed into the following three groups. These groups differ from each other mainly as regards the conception of individual selves and the worldly phenomena. Sankara's monism holds that individual selves and the worldly phenomena are delusive, having no existence, as against Brahma, and Brahma is the only reality which exists and which is immutable. The distinctive feature in Sarikara's idealism is that he denies change and difference in both the physical and the psychical worlds. But no philosophy can afford to ignore the explanation of the perceived world. The differences in the psychical and the physical realms are facts of our experience, and they cannot be passed over unexplained. For this Sankara introduces the conception of māyā, but the situation permits him to grant for māyā only status of delusion which he also assigns to the perceived world. The second group deviates from Sankara's position as regards the conception of māyā. Rāmānuja is not satisfied with the delusive status of māyā as assigned by Sarkara and thinks that māyā is a real