Structure and Functions of Soul in Jainism

SR No.: 001617
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: S C Jain
Publisher: Bharatiya Gyanpith
Publication Year: 1978
Total Pages: 272
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Epistemology, Nyay, & Spiritual
File Size: 16 MB

Page 51

The Doctrine of Syādvāda or The Jaina Dialectic :: 47
absolute truth of Brahman, upholds the truth of sūnyatā, and tries to undermine the validity of the partial comprehensions. T.R.V. Murti observes: "For the Mādhyamika all viewing, drsti as such, is avidyā; drsti is kalpanā and kalpanā is ascription of features which are non-existent in reality”.' It is again said: “The Madhyamika dialectic remove the conflict inherent in reason by rejecting both the opposites taken singly or in combination. The Mädhyamika is convinced that the conjunctive or disjunctive synthesis of the opposites is but another view." The conception of samvrti satya (empirical truth) in Buddhist philosophy just points to the admission of partial comprehensions, and such truths are needed to explain the visible world. Now the only problem is whether the Buddhist can uphold the validity of empirical truths (because samurti is also satya or true) and designate them as absolutely false. Waiving aside the problem of the validity of empirical truths this much can be admitted of this school of philosophy that partial comprehensions as truths find a place in it. Then absolute falsehood of the drstis cannot be consistently maintained. The falsehood of drstis consists of the fact that they fail to comprehend reality in its entirety but for this reason they cannot be ascriptions absolutely unconnected with reality.
Almost all the thinkers have to believe in the efficacy of the partial way of thinking and comprehension. All the systems of philosophy make a start from what is comprehensible to the thinking mind and such comprehensions are partial by their very nature. The only difference among them is that they assign varying import to them. We shall see that the partial comprehensions are not absolutely false or subjective; but at the same time they cannot be perfectly faithful to things perceived, as they are born of a analytical view-point. Such comprehensions will be found to be valid only in the systems which form a suitable context for them. For the Jaina the partial
1. T.R.V. Murti: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, p. 240 2. Ibid., p. 128