Structure and Functions of Soul in Jainism

SR No.: 001617
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: S C Jain
Publisher: Bharatiya Gyanpith
Publication Year: 1978
Total Pages: 272
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, Epistemology, Nyay, & Spiritual
File Size: 16 MB

Page 31

The Anekānta Theory of Existence :: 27
But its identity cannot be established at the level of attributes, or the criticism as given by P.T. Raju will apply to the conception of negation. We must differentiate between levels of attributes modes, traits or implicates. Negation exists at the level of traits or implicates.
Reality as a Featureless Entity
Every existent can be conceived in terms of substance, attributes, modes and traits. Umāsvāti holds a substance to be that which has attributes and modes.1 Modes and attributes are not numerically distinct members in the constitution of a substance, a substance cannot stand independently of its attributes and modes. Price has correctly said: "A characteristic is pretty obviously a characteristic of something or other, and cannot easily be supposed to be an independent entity like the weevil".? This something living behind characteristics must not be absolutely distinct from its characteristics, for, in that case, that something will be left without features and hence without a form of existence. The Nyaya theory of substance is ultimately based on the concept of a featureless reality. According to it substance and attributes are distinct categories brought into relationship by a third category of samavaya or inherence. In spite of effecting a relationship the category of samavāya just becomes a member standing in need of a relationship with the members which it aims to relate. Thus the conception of samavāya fails to solve the problem and leads to an infinite regress. The idea of a featureless reality reduces reality to a non-entity. It is meaningless to hold reality to have no features. Features are actually the forms of existence of a real; and, if it is deprived of all such forms, it must lose its existence.
Kant's conception of the thing-in-itself seems to be based on an admission of numerical difference between the features
1. Umaäsväti: Tattvärtha-sutra, v. 29
2. H.H. Price: Thinking and Experience, p. 12